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1.  Introduction 
 
Economists are paying increasing attention to the analysis of terrorism.  Contributions of 
Enders and Sandler (2006) and Krueger and Laitin (2007), among others, have analyzed the 
geographical and economic distribution of terrorist sources and targets.
1  While Enders and 
Sandler (2006) find evidence of transference of terror attacks on US interests from US soil to 
other regions, Krueger and Laitin (2007) find that richer nations are more likely to be targets, 
while politically repressed nations to be the sources of transnational terrorism.  On the other 
hand, Abadie (2006) finds that terrorism is not directly affected by economic variables, but it has 
a significant non-monotonic relationship with political freedom.   
We depart from Abadie (2006) in two main points.  First, using newly available data we 
separate the analysis of “domestic” and “transnational” terrorism.  This is important, because the 
causes and characteristics of the two, can, in principle, be quite different.
2  Second, given that 
most recent terrorist incidents have their sources in developing nations (which have increasingly 
become venues as well) our analysis focuses on developing nations.   
Our most striking finding is that while political freedom affects domestic terrorism in a 
non-linear way, it has no statistically significant relationship with transnational terrorism.  This is 
an important result for development policy.  From Krueger and Laitin (2007) we know that the 
richer nations are prime targets of transnational terrorism.  Therefore, it is in their interest to use 
aid policy to control it at the source.  If political freedom is conducive to reduction of 
transnational terrorism, they can condition their aid packages to promote such freedom.   
                                                 
1 The issue is also of interest to development economists.  For example, Fleck and Kilby (2010) find that starting 
from 9/11 the US War on Terror has led to a significant change in the level and pattern of US foreign aid.   
2 Data for domestic terrorism is available only from 1998 onwards. We use the Rand-MIPT Terrorism Database 
which defines transnational terrorism as “incidents in which the perpetrators go abroad to strike their targets, select 
domestic targets associated with a foreign state, or create international incidents by attacking airline passengers or 
equipments.”  On the other hand, “domestic terrorism is defined as incidents perpetrated by local nationals against a 
purely domestic target.”   2
However, in the absence of such a relationship, such an aid policy may not be effective in terms 
of the terror reduction objective. 
The next section describes the data. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and 
presents results, while section 4 summarizes our main findings. 
2.  Description of Data             
                 
Table 1 indicates the annual numbers of total, domestic and transnational terrorist 
incidents. For comparison purpose, we also report these incidents for 24 OECD countries.   
Domestic terrorism makes up about 89 percent of the total incidents of terrorism in our study of 
125 developing countries.
3 Two observations are in order.  First, domestic terrorism poses a 
much bigger challenge for developing countries than transnational terrorism.  Second, an 
increase in overall terrorism in the period following 2002 in developing countries can be a 
consequence of higher enforcement against terrorism in developed countries, resulting in terror 
“deflection” to developing nations (for example, see Enders and Sandler, 2006).   
  Our independent variables are number of total, domestic and transnational incidents of 
terrorism. To measure poverty, we use data on country GDP per capita constant at 2000USD.  
We include the infant mortality rate to capture the extent of deprivation and physical suffering.   
We also include population density in the model as a densely populated country can be 
more vulnerable to terrorism.  This is perhaps due to more heterogeneity in populous nations, 
which may subject them to more internal tensions (Krueger and Malečková, 2003; Burgoon, 
2006; Krueger and Laitin, 2007). The existing literature offers conflicting views on how 
                                                 
3 Iraq, Palestine and Gaza Strips are outliers and, therefore, not included in the data. Non-availability of data on 
other explanatory variables is another reason for their exclusion. Also, it is worthwhile to note that this dataset does 
not suffer from selection bias because it collects information about terrorist incidents regardless of their intensity.  
For example, Sandler and Enders (2004) note that the ITERATE dataset suffers from some drawbacks of selection 
bias because it picks up only “newsworthy” incidents of international terrorism.  
   3
education may affect terrorism (see Krueger and Malečková, 2003; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 
2003).  We use the adult literacy rate to reflect the effect of education on terrorism.
4 
Main variables of interest for this analysis are “political freedom” from Freedom House’s 
Political Rights Index and “electoral self-determination” from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) 
Human Rights Dataset.  Following Abadie (2006), we use political freedom rather than civil 
liberties to measure political climate of a country because endogeneity may be a more serious 
concern for the latter.  We invert this index, with a higher value corresponding to more freedom.  
Like political freedom, electoral self-determination indicates the extent to which citizens enjoy 
freedom of political choice.  Its index value ranges from 0 to 2, with a higher value indicating 
free and open political participation.  
To control for quality of institutions, we use the “rule of law” index compiled by 
Kaufmann et al., (2008) with scores between −2.5 and 2.5, where a higher value indicates a 
stronger legal system. We also include indices of ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
fractionalization whose values range between zero and one.  A higher value reflects the 
probability that two randomly chosen individuals from the same country belong to different 
ethnic, linguistic or religious groups.  Geographic variables include land area, elevation, fraction 
of the country in tropical climate, and whether it is landlocked.
5  
3.  The Empirical Methodology and Results 
A. Regressions without IV  
                                                 
4 Data for the GDP per capita, infant mortality rate, population density, and adult literacy rate are taken from World 
Development Indicators (2009) of the World Bank. There are some missing data values for adult literacy rate and 
infant mortality rate.  Since their values change slowly over time, values for missing observations are interpolated by 
calculating averages from available data. 
5 Fractionalization data are taken from Alesina et al., (2003), while geography data come from Gallup et al., (1991). 
   4
Since our dependent variable is a count variable and it also exhibits over-dispersion, we 
must employ either negative binomial or zero-inflated negative binomial models for estimation.  
The Vuong test favors the former (see Tables 3 and 4).
6  This method is standard and has been 
favored by several contributions to this literature (e.g., see Krueger and Malečková, 2003; 
Burgoon, 2006; Krueger and Laitin, 2007).  
Our econometric specification follows Abadie (2006).  We use annual observations for 
125 developing countries over the period 1998-2007. In order to predict the determinants of 
different types of terrorism, we separately estimate the regressions of total, domestic and 
transnational terrorist incidents. All regressions include an exhaustive set of regional and time 
dummy variables, and are estimated with robust standard errors clustered over country.
7  
Table 2 shows results for total, domestic and transnational terrorism incidents, 
respectively.  Since the findings for total and domestic terrorism are qualitatively similar, we 
focus on the latter.  Also, we discuss the results pertaining to domestic terrorism first, and then 
turn to transnational terrorism.  Along the lines of Abadie (2006), political freedom has a 
significantly non-linear effect on domestic terrorism, initially raising it, and reducing it at higher 
levels.  Other interesting findings are that neither GDP per capita nor literacy is statistically 
significant, while “rule of law” exhibits a significant negative relation.  The fractionalization 
variables suggest that ethnically diverse societies experience more domestic terrorism, while 
religiously fractionalized ones tend to face less.   
Column 3 of Table 2 pertains to transnational terrorism.  A striking result is that unlike 
domestic terrorism, political freedom does not have any statistically significant effect on 
                                                 
6 It is worthwhile to note that the zero-inflated negative binomial model rests on an untenable assumption that some 
years do not experience terrorism with probability one.  However, our central findings are qualitatively unaltered 
even when we use that model. These results are available from authors upon request.  
7 We ran several parsimonious regressions for robustness checks.  However, to save space, we report results of the 
fully specified models only.    5
transnational terrorism.  Other interesting contrasts are that GDP per capita is positive and 
significant, and that linguistically, but not ethnically, fractionalized nations experience more 
transnational terrorism.   
Columns 4-6 investigate the robustness of the above results by using electoral self-
determination as an alternative measure of democracy. The results strongly confirm our central 
finding regarding the contrasting effects of the political freedom variable.  Results for the other 
variables remain qualitatively similar to columns 1-3.     
B. IV Regressions 
To deal with potential endogeneity problems with respect to GDP per capita (see Abadie, 
2006; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008, among others), we follow Abadie (2006) and use 
geographic landlock (fraction of country area beyond 100 km of ice-free coast) as an instrument. 
The main motive for using this instrument is that it has been shown to predict economic growth 
(see Gallup et al., 1999), and the implicit identification assumption is that landlock affects 
terrorism only through its exogenous impact on national income.   
The IV results are presented in Table 3.  While GDP per capita loses statistical 
significance for transnational terrorism, our contrasting findings regarding political freedom are 
confirmed using both the political freedom index and the electoral self-determination index.   
C.  IV Fixed Effects Regressions 
  As a further robustness check, we also estimate our model employing the IV fixed effects 
Negative Binomial estimator.
8
9 Since landlock is a time invariant variable, it cannot be used as 
an instrument for GDP per capita in the fixed effects regression.  The variable of past savings 
                                                 
8 Dreher and Gassebner (2008) also employed fixed effects Negative Binomial estimator to estimate the impact of 
the political proximity to the U.S. on terrorism in 116 countries. 
9 Note that the fixed effects estimation drops the countries with all zero outcomes in terrorism incidents. That is why 
the sample size is reduced in these regressions in Table 4.   
   6
rates has been shown to affect income per capita and was used as its instrument by Acemoglu et 
al., (2008).  Following that, we also use past savings rates of a country as an instrument for its 
GDP per capita.  The identification assumption is that variations in past savings rates affect 
income per capita, but should have no direct affect on terrorism.
10  The results in Table 4 further 
reinforce our findings that political freedom in a country has significantly non-monotonic effect 
on domestic terrorism only.  
4.  Conclusion       
We complement the existing literature in the following ways.  First, using alternative 
measures of political freedom we show that Abadie’s (2006) non-linear relationship between 
terrorism and political freedom applies to domestic terrorism only, and cannot find support for it 
in the transnational terrorism data.  Second, although other factors such as geography and 
fractionalization may limit a country’s ability to curb terrorism, we consistently find that “rule of 
law” is a significant deterrent.  In the light of these findings we propose that a focus on the 
composition of terrorism (and not only on its level) is important in framing effective 
counterterrorism policy, especially for developed nations, whose interests are often prime targets 
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                                      Table1: Numbers of terrorism incidents 
 
         125 Developing Countries           24 OECD Countries 
   Total   Domestic  Trans.  Total   Domestic  Trans. 
Year terrorism  terrorism  Terrorism terrorism terrorism terrorism 
1998 745  641  104  236  205  31 
1999 640  587  53  382  323  59 
2000 547  491  56  340  303  37 
2001 692  545  147  402  381  21 
2002 1229 1022  207  269  244  25 
2003 871  695  176  304  263  41 
2004 1019  911  108  201  176  25 
2005 1630 1533  97  200  180  20 
2006 2219 2084  135  152  137  15 
2007 708  626  82  50  45  5 
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Table 2: Terrorism and country characteristics in developing countries 
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  1125 
Note: Robust absolute z-statistics, adjusted over countries, are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively.   10
Table 3: Terrorism and country characteristics in developing countries 
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  1125 
Note: Robust absolute z-statistics, adjusted over countries, are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Terrorism and country characteristics in developing countries 
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Note: Absolute z-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 10 percent levels, respectively. 